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Too much reciprocity? The invisible impact of home political 
connections on the value creation of Chinese multinationals  




Purpose - Using the evidence of Chinese outbound mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
enacted between 2006 and 2014, this study investigates the role played by home 
political connections on the cost implications of Chinese multinationals. It also 
examines whether home political connections—at different levels and of different 
configurations—impact the operational cost of Chinese multinationals.  
Design/methodology/approach - The data were analysed using a multivariate 
regression model. To examine their heterogeneous effect on Chinese multinationals, 
the political connection data were further split into higher and lower level political 
connections and in CEO and Chairperson political connections. 
Findings - This study implies the negative effect of home political connections on the 
internationalisation of Chinese multinationals. At the same time, the impact of lower-
level political connections is stronger than that of their higher-level counterparts. 
Moreover, CEO political connections have a stronger effect on the operational costs 
of Chinese multinationals than their Chairperson equivalents. 
Originality/value - By unravelling the ‘black box’ of Chinese internationalisation 
from the social exchange perspective, through the informal political connection 
networking ties between Chinese firms and the government, this study advances 
emerging market multinational theory, contributes to the understanding of the 
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heterogeneous nature of political connections, and sheds new light on social exchange 
theory from the perspective of the emerging phenomenon of Chinese 
internationalisation.  





Chinese multinationals have experienced significant growth in the last decade since 
the Chinese government promoted its going-global strategy. A great number of firms 
build up their business overseas. In particular, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have 
been dominating internationalisation from China for a long period of time. Arguably, 
a distinct linkage between business and politics characterises international activities 
from China (Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008). 
A large body of literature has focussed on the role of ownership in Chinese 
internationalisation (Deng, 2013; Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). It suggests that, due to 
their natural and formal linkages with the government, SOEs, despite enjoying 
precedence in the exploitation of key resources, face more institutional constraints 
when engaging in outbound activities (Deng, 2013).  
Nonetheless, business-political linkages are heterogeneous; some are natural, 
apparent and formal, while others are opportunistic, hidden and informal (Boisot & 
Child, 1996; Sun, Mellahi, Wright, & Xu, 2015). Political connections, which may 
belong to the latter (Deng, Yan, & van Essen, 2018), refer to informal networking ties 
between firms and the government or state (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006). 
The extant research argues that political connections help firms gain business 
advantages such as tax benefits (Wu, Wu, & Rui, 2012), bank loan (Cull & Xu, 2005), 
government bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006), and domestic trade expansion (Lu, 2011); 
however, they remain underexplored in the field of internationalisation (Deng et al., 
2018). 
Furthermore, political connections per se are complex and heterogeneous (Zhou, 
2013). Different levels of political connections may generate varying effects. From 
the governmental point of view, governments, at different levels, have different 
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motives and objectives and thus hold different expectations (Bai, Lu, & Tao, 2006; 
Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). Higher-level governments, such as the 
central government and provincial governments, are more open and outward looking, 
and are thus more supportive to the cross-border strategies of focal firms (Li, Cui, & 
Lu, 2014). In contrast, lower-level governments, such as municipal or county ones, 
focus more on local economic and social stability and growth; thus, the support of 
firm outbound activities are not their priority (Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014). As a result, firms 
with higher-level contacts have easier access to strategic resources and are thus 
favourably positioned in their home country for their international strategies. As a 
consequence, these firms are likely to strategically restructure their resources into 
cross-border activities in order to fulfil the interests of higher-level government. 
Conversely, firms with lower-level political connections are more likely to spend 
effort, time, and money to please local officials and to commit to expand their 
investment in local areas in order to gain key resources and the local government’s 
support for their internationalisation. Overall, as different political connection levels 
can leverage different resources and advantages, and generate different constraints 
and pressures (Wang et al., 2012), they require different forms of reciprocity and, as a 
consequence, may generate different outcomes. This scenario prompts the question of 
whether the heterogeneity of political connections creates differences in the 
internationalisation of Chinese multinationals.  
As a common global phenomenon, political connections have important 
economic implications (Faccio, 2006). Although prior research has identified the 
significant role played by ownership in Chinese internationalisation, our knowledge 
of how the heterogeneity of political connections influences the performance of 
Chinese multinationals remains incomplete (Brockman, Rui, & Zou, 2013; Deng et 
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al., 2018; Schweizer, Walker, & Zhang, 2017). To address the research gap associated 
with political connection heterogeneity and the performance of Chinese 
multinationals, this research employed social exchange theory to examine how the 
home political connections of Chinese multinationals affect their performance. China 
is well known for being a guanxi-based economy (Boisot & Child, 1996; Xin & 
Pearce, 1996). As a type of guanxi or informal networking tie, political connections 
entail a reciprocal relationship between firm managers and government officials. 
Thus, political connections become a tool through which Chinese firms obtain key 
resources and favourable treatment (Xin & Pearce, 1996). These key resources may 
complement the ownership advantage of and add value to focal firms. However, 
maintaining and taking advantage of political connections often involves firms 
becoming indebted and liable to government officials (Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012). 
Politically connected managers sometimes have to maintain the long-term continuity 
of their reciprocal relationships at the cost of the short-term interest of the focal firm 
(Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010). Based on this, we hypothesised that political 
connections lead to higher operational costs for multinationals. This is because, 
although political connections facilitate trust, and information and resource exchange 
between the government and focal firms, they also sometimes become a reciprocated 
burden to managers and may backfire in the operation of internationalisation. We 
found strong evidence to support this cost-increasing hypothesis. 
This research contributes to the literature mainly on two fronts. First, it provides 
new insights into the internationalisation of Chinese multinationals because it 
incorporates political connections, a type of informal networking ties. On top of that, 
it takes the heterogeneous nature of political connections into consideration by 
examining how the performance of multinationals is influenced by the heterogeneity 
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of political connections. Under social exchange theory, to maintain their relationships 
with the government, the focal firms reciprocate with reinvestment, employment, or 
other inputs; we demonstrate that political connections of different levels all have 
negative effects on the operational costs of Chinese multinationals. Moreover, lower-
level political connections show a relatively more negative impact than higher-level 
ones. We further identify the different effects of CEO and Chairperson political 
connections. In this way, we open up the operational ‘black box’ of Chinese 
multinationals using evidence drawn from Chinese outbound mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). Second, this research advances the understanding of political connections 
and extends it to the international business field by going beyond the surface of 
political connections to investigate the different valuation effects of heterogeneous 
political connections on Chinese multinationals, thereby extending the literature on 
the effects of political connection to the emerging phenomenon of internationalisation 
from emerging markets.  
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces a review 
of the literature on the social exchange, political connections, and internationalisation 
by Chinese multinationals. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the 
data sources, selection procedure, and variable measurement. Section 5 presents the 
empirical results. Section 6 discusses the implications of the findings and their 
limitations. 
 
Literature review  
China provides a particularly useful setting to examine the effects of political 
connections on the performance of multinationals from emerging markets. The 
reasons for this are twofold. First is the prevalence of guanxi in Chinese society (Xin 
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& Pearce, 1996). Guanxi is an interpersonal connection, motivated by mutual interest 
and benefit, in which people exchange favours and expect to be repaid in the future 
for any favours done (Kiong & Kee, 1998; Yang, 1994). Political connections, as a 
type of guanxi, can involve governmental support to focal firms (Claessens, Feijen, & 
Laeven, 2008; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007). Second, the Chinese government plays an 
important role in the international activities of Chinese multinationals (Du & Boateng, 
2015; Luo et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2012). This is mainly due to the Chinese 
government control of some strategic resources, and to its discretionary power in the 
legitimacy of Chinese multinationals. Overall, examining the role of home political 
connections in the internationalisation of Chinese multinationals is of relevance. 
 
Social exchange theory 
Social exchange theory posits that the process of social exchange is used to transfer 
social resources, such as access to partners, disambiguating information, and advice to 
help hone a firm’s strategic position (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Huang & Knight, 
2017). Social resources are of an indeterminate and abstract nature, and thus cannot 
be clearly defined in contracts. Partly because of this reason, the exchange process of 
social resources takes place through informal engagements in the presence of a strong 
sense of trust and affection between the parties involved (Gertler, 2003). 
The flow of such ill-defined social resources is guided by expectations of 
reciprocity, which serve as the mechanism governing social exchange (Blau, 1964; 
Lincoln, Gerlach, & Takahashi, 1992; Molm, Peterson, & Takahashi, 1999). 
Reciprocity refers to the general obligation of an actor to give a benefactor something 
in return for what it has received (Uzzi, 1996). Social exchange can only be achieved 
under the assumption that the actors accept some costs and uncertainty in the short 
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term, and that the value of the favours will be reciprocated in some way at some time 
(Molm et al., 1999). Thus, reciprocity is not a one-shot contractual governance mode, 
but a long-term orientation with the expectation of a return of favours at an undefined 
future date (Gouldner, 1960).  
As social exchange is maintained in the long term through the governance 
mechanism of reciprocity, the actors are obliged to achieve their commitment of 
reciprocity by ‘paying back’ and ‘paying forward’ the benefactors who have done 
them favours. O’Brien and David (2014) believed that actors may use their privileged 
positions to ‘pay back’ their benefactors with generous terms, such as quality and 
price adjustments, and to ‘pay forward’ by finding ways to instigate growth 
opportunities suited to benefit their benefactors in the future. In this way, the 
relationship involved in social exchange can be safeguarded in the long term.  
In the following sections, we illustrate how social exchange occurs in the 
outbound M&A process via the political connections between Chinese multinationals’ 




Political connections have become an increasingly popular topic (Faccio, 2006; 
Fisman, 2001). Political connections refer to informal social networking ties with 
governments (Claessens et al., 2008; Faccio, 2006; Fan et al., 2007). Unlike formal 
governmental ties, political connections are implicit, informal, and bottom-up ties 
motivated by individual interest (Xu & Zhou, 2008).  
The extant research posits that political connections have proved to be an 
important factor in determining firm performance (Sun et al., 2012). Some literature 
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implies that political connections have a positive effect on firm performance. For 
example, a S&P 500 analysis shows that politically connected boards are positively 
correlated to abnormal stock returns (Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009). A study of 
Latvian firms shows that politically connected CEOs improve firm value by gaining 
governmental support (Dombrovsky, 2011). In contrast, other streams of literature 
suggest that political connections have negative impacts on firms. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) noted that governments might share any benefits generated through political 
connections to achieve political goals. A study of Chinese listed firms shows that, in 
the long term, politically connected firms have poorer post-IPO performance than 
non-politically connected ones (Fan et al., 2007). Thus, governments act as grabbing 
hands towards firms with political connections, and negatively affect their value and 
performance (Frye & Shleifer, 1996).  
Despite being a worldwide phenomenon, political connections may play a more 
significant role in emerging and transitional countries (Faccio, 2006) such as China. 
In China, such ties are generally built in two ways: by executives serving as members 
of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) or as deputies in 
the National People’s Congress (NPC), or by the appointment of current or former 
government officials as corporate executives (Zhou, 2013).  
From the viewpoint of social exchange, political connections can be seen as an 
opportunistic and instrumental dimension of company relationships, reflecting 
informal social connections to the government or state. Political connections facilitate 
a firm’s exchange with the government for those relatively highly particularistic and 
abstract social resources that are mostly in the control of the latter; for example, 
financial bailouts, and privileges and convenience in accessing new policy 
explanations. Consequently, politically connected firms are motivated to adhere to 
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political objectives and to help the government to achieve its political goals (Fan et 
al., 2007; Shleifer, 1998). For example, Jia and Zhang (2013) found evidence that 
CEOs with political connections have higher probability of making donations aimed 
at satisfying the needs of the government. However, in some cases, firms are likely to 
damage their value at the expense of sacrificing the benefits of other stakeholders 
(Hovey, Li, & Naughton, 2003). 
 
Internationalisation by Chinese multinationals 
China’s 2001 going-global strategy has greatly accelerated the internationalisation of 
Chinese firms (Luo et al., 2010). Over the past few decades, the strategy of Chinese 
firms has changed from acquiring the status of national giants within China to 
becoming global players. Outbound M&As have been the dominant means of 
internationalisation adopted by Chinese firms (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2004; 
Luo et al., 2010). By acquiring existing firms with advanced technologies, Chinese 
multinationals have gained access to the latter’s strategic assets (Ai & Tan, 2018; 
Zheng, Wei, Zhang, & Yang, 2016), which refers to those resources and capabilities 
that are valued for their potential to contribute to the acquiring firms’ competitive 
advantage (Deng, 2004).  
With the development of Chinese multinationals and emergence of outbound 
M&As from China, the Chinese government exploits regulations and restrictions to 
safeguard its home assets, benefit the state’s interests, and prevent potential capital 
flights (Cui & Jiang, 2010; Deng, 2013; Luo et al., 2010). Considerable obstacles 
contribute to the relatively higher complexity of Chinese outbound M&As. The first 
of these obstacles is related to the rigid approval system. According to regulations, 
overseas investment projects over a certain amount must be submitted to the relevant 
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authorities for ‘step by step approval, and quota management’ (Ministry of Commerce 
of China, 2009). Potential Chinese acquiring firms not only have to get permission 
from the government before entering into any formal bidding and negotiation process 
with their target firms, but also have to endure the scrutiny of multiple agencies 
ranging from provincial government branches to the central government (Tan & Ai, 
2010). Whereas, from the government’s perspective, such a system may ensure that 
all investments are closely aligned with the state’s strategic geopolitical objectives, 
from the perspective of Chinese acquiring firms, this overly rigid regulatory 
arrangement exposes them to great risk in the enactment of cross-border M&As. The 
second obstacle is associated with the financing of outbound M&As, which require 
financial support to succeed. However, Chinese acquiring firms are subject to 
financial restrictions in terms of the extent of domestic loans and foreign exchange. 
Such financial support restrictions limit their financing capacity in outbound M&As, 
causing them to miss some opportunities.  
Correspondingly, part of the extant research is mainly focussed on how Chinese 
multinationals respond to the institutional pressures exerted by the Chinese 
government (e.g., Cui & Jiang, 2010). In particular, most research has examined the 
role played by ownership in Chinese outbound investment from the formal political 
network perspective (Luo et al., 2010; Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012). However, little 
is known about the role played by informal political networks in the outbound 
investments of Chinese multinationals. 
The next section attempts to link Chinese multinationals with informal political 
networks. Drawing upon social exchange theory, we build hypotheses on the 





Political connections serve as reciprocal relationships between firms and the 
government. First, political connections may help firms to gain additional tangible 
resources. Politically connected firms can leverage their links with the government to 
gain priority access to government-controlled resources, such as foreign currency 
(Faccio et al., 2006), which are key and particularistic resources in cross-border 
investment activities. Second, politically connected firms are likely to make a good 
impression and further obtain intangible favourable treatment from regulatory 
authorities. For instance, political connections may reduce the information asymmetry 
of Chinese firms and enable firms to effectively shorten their communication 
channels with the government. Considering the time-consuming regulatory approval 
system, good relations with ‘key persons’ in the government can make approval 
processes more time efficient. As such, in China, politically connected firms may face 
less regulatory barriers than non-politically connected ones, and are thus more likely 
to be presented with outbound investment opportunities.  
However, as discussed above in relation to social exchange theory, although 
political connections bring benefits to focal firms, politically connected firms need to 
repay any debts accrued for the benefits gained (Yang, 1994). This reciprocity may 
neutralise such benefits, increasing operational costs and the likelihood of investments 
failing (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2018). The reasons for this are as 
follows. First, politically connected multinationals may increase their investments as a 
tacit reciprocity commitment to the government. Bertrand et al. (2018) showed that 
political connected firms are burdened by excessive human resource costs because 
political connected CEOs create more job opportunities in areas characterised by 
 13 
higher levels of political competition. Similarly, Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) 
found that public firms employ excess labour to meet political objectives. Sun, Vinig, 
and Hosman (2017) posited that Chinese multinationals make much inefficient 
investment due to their connections with the government. Either new investment or 
re-investment fit in exactly with the government officials’ wishes because such 
behaviours may create job opportunities and future economic growth potential. As a 
consequence, the social exchange mechanism of reciprocity may play a negative role 
in the operation of internationalisation by Chinese multinationals, and result in 
increases in operational costs. 
Based on this analysis, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: Political connections are likely to be positively correlated to the operational 
costs of Chinese multinationals.  
 
Different political connection levels also have an effect on the value creation of 
Chinese multinationals. This may derive from the heterogeneity of governmental 
bodies in terms of their interests and objectives (Bai et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2012; 
Wu et al., 2012) and from the specific forms of support that political connected firms 
can obtain.  
Lower-level governments focus mainly on local social stability and economic 
output. Firms politically connected at lower levels are more encouraged and 
supported to expand their business within local regions (Lu, 2011; Wang et al., 2012). 
Thus, these firms may experience harder communication with local-level regulatory 
approval authorities. After succeeding in going global, Chinese multinationals are 
often obliged to reciprocate those local government bodies that had done them 
favours. In most cases, reciprocity takes on the form of increased investment in local 
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regions. Firms may build new manufacturing bases, R&D and logistics centres, or 
make further investment. In doing so, they create potential opportunities for local 
future growth in terms of employment, talent cultivation, and knowledge transfer. 
However, in some cases, the regions the local governments of which offered help to 
the focal firms do not possess any location advantage of either investment or 
reinvestment. Some regions may be distant from the relevant market, thus making the 
building of manufacturing factories or logistics centres uneconomic, while others may 
not be suited to the establishment of R&D centres due to serious talent outflow. Due 
to the favourable treatment received from local government bodies, Chinese 
multinationals can be very likely to reciprocate by partly sacrifice their own interest. 
As a result, this may increase the invisible operational costs of internationalisation of 
those Chinese firms that have lower level political connections. 
By contrast, higher-level government bodies possess more political resources, are 
empowered to approve cross-border investment (Luo et al., 2010), and hold the 
expectation that outbound investment may reinforce China’s national security and 
competitiveness in the international arena. Therefore, they hold a more international 
and outward looking perspective (Wang et al., 2012). Meanwhile, higher-level 
political connections imply a relatively stronger capability of either the management 
or the focal firm. Thus, high-level government bodies have a propensity to endorse 
these firms with more opportunities, intermediary governmental services, and 
privileged information. Such relationship-based advantage may reduce the focal 
firms’ transaction costs with the government, and thus add value to them. In 
reciprocity to these higher-level government bodies, the focal firms are likely to 
restructure their resources to balance their international strategic initiatives in the 
interest of the state. The focal firms will further expand their collaboration with their 
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foreign counterparts in the form of joint ventures, R&D centres, and manufacturing 
bases both in China and abroad. When the focal firms become globally competitive 
they highly align themselves with the strategic priorities of higher-level government 
bodies and fulfil the interest of the state.  
On basis of this discussion, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: Lower-level political connections are likely to generate more operational 
costs for Chinese multinationals than their higher-level counterparts. 
 
Research design 
Data sources and sample selection 
The hypotheses were tested based on a sample of Chinese firms engaged in outbound 
M&As between 2006 and the first quarter of 2014. Outbound M&As from China have 
been in full swing over the last two decades, while both value and volume start to rise 
since 2006 (Sun, 2018). Chinese firms were listed primarily on Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. Information about M&As were sourced from the Zephyr 
Database, which provides abundant information on M&As such as names of acquiring 
and acquired firms, deal value, deal completion date, industrial sector, and location. 
Information about characteristics of Chinese top management team was sourced from 
the Chinese Stock Market Research (CSMAR) Database. CSMAR incorporates up-to-
date information and less missing data. Specifically, M&A performance data was 
extracted from the section of the financial index of Chinese listed firms, and data of 
political connection was extracted from the section of top managers’ characteristics of 
listed firms.  
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The initial population consisted of 2475 M&A completed deals by Chinese firms. 
To improve the accuracy and objectivity, the research sample was selected based on 
the following restrictions: (1) M&A deals by financial firms were eliminated. This is 
mainly because financial firms have a different accounting system, which may bias 
results. (2) ST firms were eliminated. (3) Firms listed in B stock market and H stock 
market were eliminated, due to the use of different accounting and reporting systems. 
(4) Because data of non-listed firms usually are unavailable, M&A deals by non-listed 
firms were eliminated. (5) M&A deals must be completed for more than one year, so 
that we can test the long-term firm performance. Therefore, the deals completed less 
than one year were eliminated. (6) If two or more than two outbound deals by the 
same acquiring firm occurred in the same year, the first completed M&A deal was 
selected. If there were different outbound deals by the same acquiring firm in different 
years, these deals were incorporated as individual M&A event into the sample. After 
eliminating the preliminary sample, the final sample consisted of 225 M&A deals.  
Variable measurement 
As for the dependent variable, the research used the one-year-after accounting 
performance (Yeung, Lee, & Yeung, 2013). The reason for using accounting 
performance instead of stock performance is that financial returns may not highlight 
the effects of political influence (Ding, Jia, Wu, & Zhang, 2014). In our research, we 
used operating expense ratio to measure the operational cost (Cannon & Homburg, 
2001). In addition, we defined the time frame of operating expense ratio by trailing 
twelve months (OERTTM) to make sure that the operational cost is measured in a 
long-term range (Cannon & Homburg, 2001).  
In terms of the independent variable, political connection was measured if CEO 
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and/or Chairperson of a firm is formerly or currently the government officer, deputy 
of NPC or member of CPPCC (Chan, Dang, & Yan, 2012; Wu et al., 2012; Zhou, 
2013). Three types of measurement are usually adopted to measure political 
connection, including assignment measurement (Du, Chen, & Du., 2010), ratio 
measurement (Fan et al., 2007), and dummy variable measurement (Faccio, 2006). 
The assignment measurement regards the value of political connection as the level of 
political position. For example, the officer at central level, provincial level, city level 
and the level below is assigned different value from “4” to “1” and no political 
connection assigned “0” (Du et al., 2010). The ratio measurement estimates the 
percentage of CEO and/or Chairperson who is politically connected in the entire 
management team (Fan et al., 2007). The dummy variable means that political 
connection is coded “1” if the firm has a politically connected CEO and/or 
Chairperson, and “0” otherwise.  
Although the dummy variable is dominant in the measurement of political 
connection, the problem is that the dummy variable leads to a limited understanding 
towards the variant effects of political connection at different levels. Taking it into 
consideration, we adopted a mixed approach by using the assignment measurement 
and ratio measurement. To be specific, we estimated the percentage of politically 
connected management in the entire management team (PC). Furthermore, we 
categorised political connection into political connection with higher-level 
government (H_PC), such as the central or provincial government and PC with lower-
level government, such as the municipal and county government (L_PC) (Li et al., 
2014). We used the percentage of CEO or Chairperson in the entire management team 
to measure if CEO or Chairperson of the firm is politically connected (PC_CEO and 
PC_CHA, respectively) at higher level (H_CEO and H_CHA, respectively), or at 
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lower level (L_CEO and L_CHA, respectively). By doing so, not only the 
disadvantage of dummy variable is offset, the heterogeneous nature of political 
connection is manifested. 
This research also introduced some control variables. First, we took ownership, 
measuring by the ratio of state-shares in the total outstanding shares (Li, Sun, & Zou, 
2009) as one of the control variables. As discussed above, state ownership 
unavoidably brings political objectives into corporate decision making, which can 
change corporate value (Du & Boateng, 2015). Second, the study used the total asset 
to control the acquiring firm size. Firm size indicates that acquiring firms have the 
capacity to generate value through economies of scale and scope (Du & Boateng, 
2015). Third, the firm with higher leverage is easier to get the long-term loan, which 
is positively related to the long-term performance of the firm. Thus, the leverage of 
the firm was controlled. Fourth, as firm age indicates acquiring firms’ experience of 
doing business, which may influence the corporate performance, the firm age, 
measured by the number of established years of the firm, was controlled. Fifth, the 
industrial sector was controlled as dummy variable in our model. In total, five 
industrial sector dummy variables were generated, ranging from public utility, real 
estate, agriculture, and manufacturing to commercial industry. Sixth, as the target 
countries have different institutional system, whether the target countries are 
developing or developed countries may affect the cost performance, therefore, 
location was under controlled as dummy variable. It was coded “1” if the target 
countries are developing countries, otherwise “0”. Finally, as macroeconomic 
situation varies in different years, the M&A completion years were controlled as year 
dummy variable. Table I provides the variable measurement and descriptive statistics.  
[Insert Table I about here] 
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Analysis and results 
Descriptive analysis 
Table II presents the industry distribution and M&A completion year distribution. 
Panel A shows that the sample covered 5 industrial sectors, among which the 
manufacture industry accounted for 76.4% of the 225 outbound M&A deals, while the 
real estate industry accounted only for 2.2%. Besides, the public utility industry, 
agricultural industry and commercial industry made up for 13.8%, 3.1% and 4.4%, 
respectively. Panel B reports that only 5 outbound M&A events took place in 2006. 
The deal number grows rapidly, from 18 deals in 2007 to 58 deals in 2012. 
[Insert Table II about here] 
 
Table III demonstrates the distribution of the target location. Half of outbound M&A 
deals were target in HK, America, and Germany, accounting for 20.9%, 20.4%, and 
11.6%, respectively. For the rest of the target countries, the distribution was rather 
decentralised. 
[Insert Table III about here] 
 
Table IV reports correlation matrix of the variables. It shows that in terms of 
independent variables, PC is significantly related to political connections at different 
levels and of configurations, and OERTTM. In terms of other variables, the 
correlations are fairly low, and variance inflation factor scores are within the cut-off 
point of 10, thus multi-collinearity appears not to be a problem. 
[Insert Table IV about here] 
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Results of the empirical analysis 
In order to analyse the explanatory power of political connection related to the value 
creation of outbound M&As by Chinese multinationals as indicated by the research 
hypothesis above, and we employ multivariate regressions to relate political 
connection to the M&A cost performance. Specifically, we estimate the following 
(basic) regression model:  
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
where the dependent variable is cost performance. As described above, we used 
OERTTM as the performance measure. The major independent variable is political 
connection. In different regressions, political connection can be replaced by PC, 
H_PC, L_PC, PC_CEO, PC_CHA, L_CEO, H_CEO, L_CHA, and H_CHA, which 
are described in Table I. Control variables are also present in Table I. Following 
Bouwman, Fuller & Nain (2009), year and industry dummies are included to control 
for year and industry effects, respectively. Year and industry dummies are included in 
the regression, but not reported to save space. 
Table V presents the empirical results. Model 1 shows that political connection 
has a positive impact on the operational cost of Chinese multinationals, as the impact 
of PC on OERTTM is significantly positive. Moreover, both H_PC and L_PC are 
positively related to OERTTM. Therefore, H1 is supported. Comparing Model 2 and 
Model 3, it indicates that political connections at lower level generate slightly higher 
operational cost in outbound M&As than political connections at higher level. The 
finding is consistent with H2.  
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[Insert Table V about here] 
 
Furthermore, we tested the impact of CEO and Chairperson’s political connection at 
different levels on the operational cost of Chinese multinationals in Table VI. It shows 
that the effect of lower-level political connections of CEO and Chairperson has a huge 
difference compared to that of higher-level political connections of CEO and 
Chairperson. Model 4 shows that political connection of CEO at higher level is 
positively but insignificantly related to the operational cost of Chinese multinationals. 
In contrast, Model 5 suggests that political connection of CEO at lower level is both 
positively and significantly related to Chinese multinationals’ operational cost. 
Similarly, while higher-level political connection of Chairperson has no significant 
effect, as shown in Model 6, lower-level political connection of Chairperson has a 
significantly positive impact on the operational cost, as shown in Model 7. Taking 
together, the empirical result supports H2, too. 
We then examined the effect of political connection of CEO and Chairperson on 
the operational cost of Chinese multinationals, respectively. Model 8 and Model 9 
report the results. It shows that political connection of CEO has a significant and 
positive effect while that of Chairperson has insignificant effect. Looking at Model 5 
and Model 7, the results suggest that politically connected CEO has a stronger impact 
than politically connected Chairperson at lower level. Thus, the results are consistent. 
It indicates that politically connected CEO is more important than politically 
connected Chairperson in the daily operation of Chinese multinationals engaging in 
outbound investment.  
[Insert Table VI about here] 
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Discussion and conclusion 
This study has investigated the role played by political connections in the operational 
costs of Chinese multinationals. Using a sample of 255 outbound M&A deals enacted 
by Chinese multinationals between 2006 and the first quarter of 2014, we have 
unravelled the ‘black box’ of Chinese internationalisation from the perspective of 
informal business-political linkages. 
This study makes significant contributions on three fronts. First, it advances the 
understanding of the internationalisation of firms from emerging markets by 
researching informal networking ties—i.e., political connections. The extant literature 
has mainly focussed on the role played by ownership, a formal institutional 
relationship, in the internationalisation process of Chinese multinationals. Little is 
known about whether and how informal networking ties play a role in this new 
phenomenon. The empirical results show a negative correlation of political 
connections with the operations of Chinese multinationals. We argue that such 
negative correlation is due to the reciprocity of the latter’s commitments and 
behaviours to the government. In doing so, this study specifies the significant role 
played by political connections in the value creation of Chinese multinationals.  
Second, this research furthers the literature on political connections by taking 
their heterogeneity into consideration. It implies the negative effect of political 
connections—and that of lower level ones in particular—on the value creation of 
Chinese multinationals. We find evidence that the operational costs of Chinese 
multinationals increase significantly as a consequence of lower-level political 
connections. It indicates that political connections increase the indebtedness of firms 
to government bodies. Moreover, the much stronger damaging impact of lower-level 
political connections on the performance of Chinese multinationals is attributed to the 
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diverse objectives of governments at different levels, with lower level politically 
connected firms returning any favours to local governments by promptly investing or 
reinvesting in local regions to satisfy the latter’s political objectives. Conversely, 
higher-level government bodies are generally more long-term focussed and more 
supportive of the further outbound expansion of politically connected firms. In 
addition, the results indicate that CEO political connections have a stronger effect on 
value creation compared to Chairperson ones. This may be because CEOs take charge 
of the daily decision-making and routine matters and are the principal decision 
executors; thus, CEO political connections may be more instrumental in raising the 
potential information and legitimacy benefits of firms (Wu, Li, & Li, 2013). By 
contrast, rather than being involved in daily trivialities, Chairpersons are in charge of 
macro issues, and their political ties are thus less essential to their firms’ operation. In 
this way, our research contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of political 
connections. 
Third, this research has employed social exchange theory to explain the 
interaction between firms and government bodies in the specific area of Chinese 
internationalisation. Based on the social exchange view, this study indicates that 
reciprocity is the governance mechanism that maintains the long-term social exchange 
via political connections with the government. The reciprocal repayments enacted by 
beneficiary politically connected firms entail their loyalty and commitment to the 
government bodies. The forms taken by this reciprocity vary depending on the 
interests of the specific government bodies. In the case of outbound M&As, it often 
takes the form of providing (paying back) higher quality products to domestic 
customers, or of paying forward potential opportunities for economic growth and 
social development. However, sometimes, such reciprocity comes at a cost to the 
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beneficiary firms. As a consequence, the social exchange and reciprocity mechanism 
increases the operational costs of politically connected Chinese multinationals. 
With regard to practical implications, most international scholars and business 
professionals have increased their focus on state ownership, but have neglected the 
significant role played by invisible political connections on the value of Chinese 
multinationals. Our findings may remind Chinese multinationals of the invisible side 
of political connections and of the resulting reciprocity in their internationalisation. 
Moreover, the host country target firms should also be aware of the damaging effects 
of their Chinese counterparts’ invisible networking ties.  
This study presents several limitations that provide possible directions for future 
research. First, there is a lack of specific interpretations of the intrinsic mechanisms 
governing the effects of CEO and/or Chairperson political connections—either higher 
or lower level ones—on the value creation of Chinese multinationals. Second, this 
study has only taken the target locations into consideration. However, as some 
scholars suggest, home political connections with government bodies in different 
domestic areas does exert heterogeneous influences on investment performance (e.g. 
Zhou, 2013), thus the effects of location or home country areas in the relationship 
between political connections and investment performance should be investigated. We 
suggest that future studies should extend both theoretical and empirical research to 
reveal these specific aspects.  
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